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by credit markets. The remaining 30 percent are not smoothed. Our results bring to light
the critical role that Alberta plays in trading-off credit market smoothing for more capital
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1 Introduction
The notion that regions in a federal system can pool together their risks to insure (fully) against
idiosyncratic uncertainty in their resources has generated an impressive volume of work in the
past two decades. The collection of papers in Hess and van Wincoop (2000) provides a good
review of the literature. Our objective in this paper is to quantify the amount of interprovincial
risk-sharing in Canada by focusing on both market and nonmarket channels of risk-sharing.
The case of Canada comes quite naturally as the provinces constitute a federation with a
different division of powers between federal and provincial governments.1 Most importantly,
the Canadian constitution explicitly allows the federal government to contribute to significant
smoothing of regional shocks through the system of ‘equalization payments’, which is designed to
address differences in revenue-raising capacity across provinces.2 This is perhaps why Canadian
federalism displays rather strong interprovincial risk-sharing via taxes and intergovernmental
transfers than that of the U.S. federal states system (see, e.g., Bayoumi and Masson (1995),
Antia et al. (1999) and Me´ltiz and Zumer (2002)).
In an influential paper, Asdrubali, Sørensen and Yosha (1996) offer an intriguing way of
assessing regional risk-sharing via simple decomposition of output that allows to distinguish
between two important channels through which risk can be shared: market and nonmarket.
The market channel in turn comprises two separate channels, where regions can pool their risk
through cross-ownership of productive assets (the “capital” market channel) or through lending
or borrowing (the “credit” market channel). The nonmarket channel involves pooling risks by
exchanging claims to regional output in the form of equity or through fiscal transfer arrange-
ments (for instance, ‘equalization payments’ in the Canadian case). In practice, implementation
of Asdrubali et al. (1996) method requires regional output, distributed income (before federal
government net transfers), disposable income (after the transfer), and consumption. Based on
U.S. states data over the period 1963-1990, Asdrubali et al. (1996) find that 62 percent of
shocks to gross state product are smoothed by market channels, whilst only 13 percent shocks
are smoothed by the nonmarket channels. The remaining 25 percent are not smoothed.
The novelty of Asdrubali et al. (1996) framework is that it has brought together in a
single framework important smoothing mechanisms that were often treated separately in the
1Data limitation prevents us from including the territories in the analysis: Northwest Territories, Yukon and
Nunavut.
2The Constitution Act of 1982 reaffirms that the federal government is responsible for equalizing the ability
of provincial governments to provide comparable levels of public services at comparable levels of taxation. In
this respect, Canadian federalism goes well beyond the redistributional objectives of the U.S. federal system.
Supplementing the system of equalization payments is the Canada Social Transfer (CST) and Canada Health
Transfer (CST) programs that assist provincial funding in the areas of health, post-secondary education, and
social welfare.
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literature. For example, Bayoumi and Masson (1995) and Me´ltiz and Zumer (2002) examine
regional risk-sharing through the lens of central government transfers. Atkenson and Bayoumi
(1993) work on the attenuation of regional shocks through capital market integration, while
Bayoumi and Klein (1997) examine smoothing of regional shocks through the credit market
channels. In comparison, Athanasoulis and van Wincoop (1998) center on the capital market
and central government channels, while neglecting smoothing via credit markets. In this paper,
we make use of the Asdrubali et al. (1996) framework to quantify the amount of interprovincial
risk-sharing achieved at each of these levels of smoothing in Canada.
1.1 Related literature
Several papers (e.g., Bayoumi and Masson (1995), Me´ltiz and Zumer (1999, 2002), Obstfeld
and Peri (1998)) observe that the federal government plays a significant role in stabilization and
redistribution in Canada. The range for the federal offset of transitory shocks (i.e., stabilization)
is 9% to 17%, while for permanent shocks (i.e., redistribution), it is 17% to 53%. These results
suggest that redistribution plays a considerably more prominent role in Canada than does
stabilization.3 Overall, these results are a reflection of the influential role of the equalization
system as well as the greater preference for national equity standards in Canada.
A classic question in the international and national risk-sharing literature is to what extent
the consumption risk differs across regions or countries. According to the theory of aggregate
risk-sharing, access to a complete market for financial assets should enable risk-sharing and
decoupling of consumption and output among individual households. Crucini (1999) studies
this issue by employing panel data that includes the Canadian provinces, U.S. states, and G-7
countries. Crucini (1999) observes that the average estimated risk-sharing parameter tends
toward 0.9 (close to the complete risk-sharing benchmark of unity) across Canadian provinces.4
This result also holds for U.S. states, while the effect is much lower for the G-7 countries.
Antia, Djoudad and St-Amant (1999) measure how much risk-sharing is achieved via dif-
ferent mechanisms (e.g., capital markets, federal taxes and transfers, credit markets) using the
framework proposed by Asdrubali et al. (1996). Employing annual data for Canadian provinces
from 1962-1995, Antia et al. (1999) find that 37 percent of the shocks to gross provincial prod-
uct are smoothed by capital markets, 27 percent are smoothed by the federal government,
and another 27 percent are smoothed by credit markets. The remaining 14 percent are not
3In comparison to the United States, the degree of redistribution is slightly higher in Canada, while the ability
of the federal fiscal system to stabilize incomes is roughly the same in two countries. Vigneault (2002) provides
further details.
4The province-specific estimate of the risk-sharing parameter ranged from a low of 0.72 for British Columbia,
to a high of 0.99 for Prince Edward Island and New Brunswick.
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smoothed.
The paper by Antia et al. (1999) is more closely related to our work. However, our approach
differs from the existing literature along two important dimensions. First, given the panel nature
of the data used, much of the existing literature remains silent on the issue of cross-section
dependence. Many panel data sets are characterized by dependencies among individuals due
for instance to the presence of common shocks, such as changes in oil prices. Accounting for
cross-section dependence in the estimation procedure is crucial, since ignoring the cross-section
correlation is known to cause severe size distortion, so that the power gain delivered by the
panel dimension, is entirely fictitious. We incorporate the potential cross-section dependence
due to common shocks hitting different provinces at the same time.
Consequently, we apply the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) panel data estimator that is robust to
very general forms of temporal and cross-section dependence. Their approach consists of apply-
ing a standard nonparametric heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation consistent (HAC) variance
estimator to the cross-sectional average of the moment conditions identifying the parameter of
interest. The consistency of the standard errors is established under the assumption of large T
asymptotic, independently of the panel’s cross-section dimension N . This is a desirable prop-
erty given the short cross-section dimension of our panel data (i.e., N = 10). The simulation
results in Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and Hoechle (2007) show that, when cross-section depen-
dence is present, the Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors dominate alternative standard
errors such as least squares, White (1980) and Newey and West (1987) that assume cross-section
independence across individuals of the panel.
Second, we extend our overall risk-sharing accounting into the dimension of pairwise (or
bilateral) risk-sharing, which allows to quantify the extent of risk-sharing for all possible pairs
in the panel.5 One limitation of the overall existing approach is that it says nothing about which
partner a particular province shares risk with. For example, effective risk-sharing between Que-
bec and Ontario might be virtually nonexistent, as they are both specialized in manufacturing
industries and may have highly correlated income as a result. In fact, these two provinces might
be sharing risk with potentially different third parties, rather than with each other. This pos-
sibility motivated us to examine the risk-sharing in a bilateral context. Recently, Imbs (2005)
and Fratzscher and Imbs (2008) implement the concept of bilateral risk-sharing on international
data, in this paper intra-national data are brought to the issue.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the variance decom-
position of output, while Section 3 discusses the econometric issues. Section 4 presents data and
5This paper takes pairwise risk-sharing and bilateral risk-sharing as synonymous.
4
main empirical results. Section 5 outlines the pairwise approach in more detail and discusses
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Channels of risk-sharing: Decomposing the cross-sectional
variance of shocks to provincial output
This section provides an overview of the Asdrubali et al. (1996) framework relating to the
variance decomposition of output. Suppose we have a panel data for per capita provincial
output GPPi (where i stands for the individual province), per capita provincial income PIi, per
capita provincial disposable income PDIi, and per capita provincial consumption Ci+Gi (private
and public consumption), all stated in real terms. Let us begin with the identity,
GPPi =
GPPi
PIi
PIi
PDIi
PDIi
(Ci + Gi)
(Ci + Gi). (1)
To stress the cross-sectional nature of our derivation, we suppress the time index. Taking
logs and differences on both sides of (1), multiplying both sides by ∆ logGPPi, and taking
expectations, we obtain the variance decomposition in ∆ logGPPi,
var{∆ logGPPi} = cov{∆ logGPPi −∆ log PIi,∆ logGPPi}
+ cov{∆ log PIi −∆ log PDIi,∆ logGPPi}
+ cov{∆ log PDIi −∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGPPi}
+ cov{∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGPPi} .
In the above equation var{X} and cov{X,Y} denote the statistics 1N
∑N
i=1(Xi−X¯)2 and 1N
∑N
i=1(Xi−
X¯)(Yi − Y¯), respectively, where N is the number of Canadian provinces. Dividing (1) by
var{∆ logGPPi} we get 1 = βk + βf + βc + βu, where, for example,
βk =
cov{∆ logGPPi −∆ log PIi,∆ logGPPi}
var{∆ logGPPi} ,
is the slope in the cross-sectional regression of ∆ logGPPi−∆ log PIi on ∆ logGPPi, and similarly
for βf , and βc. The last coefficient in the decomposition is given as,
βu =
cov{∆ log(Ci + Gi),∆ logGPPi}
var{∆ logGPPi} ,
is the slope in the cross-sectional regression of ∆ log(Ci + Gi) on ∆ logGPPi.
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The coefficients βk, βf and βc are interpreted as the fraction of shocks absorbed through
capital markets, federal tax-transfer system, and credit markets, respectively; whereas the co-
efficient βu denotes the fraction of shocks to provincial GPP that is not smoothed. If perfect
risk-sharing exists, these coefficients add to unity and βu = 0. If not, they sum to less than
unity.6 The sum of βk and βc constitutes the fraction of shocks smoothed through transactions
on markets. Nevertheless, βk differs from βc in that the former is the result of ex ante arrange-
ment, prior to the occurrence of shocks, whereas the latter takes place ex post, after shocks
occurs. Asdrubali et al. (1996) argue that capital market (βk) can provide insurance against
persistent as well as transitory shocks; whereas credit market (βc) typically smooth only tran-
sitory shocks, since lenders in other provinces might be reluctant to grant credit to provinces
that are hit by shocks that are expected to persist.
We do not impose any restrictions on the sign of the β-coefficients. If a province that is hit
by a positive shock has a smaller share of GPP allocated to, e.g., through credit markets, then
savings might provide cross-sectional dis-smoothing. Similarly, if taxes increase or decrease less
than proportionately with output, they generate dis-smoothing.
3 Econometric issues
Following equation (1), at the practical level, the panel equations are estimated as follows,
∆ logGPPit −∆ log PIit = α+ βk∆ logGPPit + eit, (capital market smoothing), (2)
∆ log PIit −∆ log PDIit = α+ βf∆ logGPPit + eit, (federal govt. smoothing), (3)
∆ log PDIit −∆ log(Cit + Git) = α+ βc∆ logGPPit + eit, (credit market smoothing), (4)
∆ log(Cit + Git) = α+ βu∆ logGPPit + eit, (unsmoothed component), (5)
where i = 1, 2, ..., N and t = 1, 2, ..., T . Panel estimation of equations (2)–(5) involves several
challenges. In the case of panel data models where the cross-section dimension (N) is small
and the time series dimension (T ) is large, it is typical to treat the equations from the different
cross-section units as a system of seemingly unrelated regression equations (SURE) and then
estimate the system by generalized least squares (GLS) techniques. This is the approach used
by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and maintained in the subsequent literature. The main limitation
of this approach is that it is based on the assumption of cross-section independence, such an
6Likewise, if risk-sharing is achieved through capital market alone, βk = 1; while βk + βf = 1 is risk-sharing
is achieved through the combination of capital market and federal transfers smoothing, and so on for any other
combination. The bottom line is that these coefficients reflect the incremental amount of smoothing achieved
through the various channels discussed above.
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assumption is far from realistic.7
There are clearly many channels through which residuals of the panel regressions can be con-
temporaneously correlated. In particular, they could be due to common observed global shocks
(such as changes in oil prices), they could arise as a result of global unobserved factors (such as
the diffusion of technological progress), or could be due to specific national or sectoral shocks.
Whilst the presence of common shocks is likely to generate dependence among individuals in
the panel, their impact may not be the same across different cross-section units. Accounting
for cross-section dependence is crucial in order to obtain consistent estimates of the standard
errors of the regression parameters. Besides the cross-section dependence, we might also expect
the errors to show heteroscedasticity and serial correlation.
The main essence of a panel estimator, in the presence of nonspherical errors, is the con-
sistent estimator of the covariance matrix. Standard estimators such as White (1980) Newey
and West (1987) are useful to correct for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, however, they
do not correct for cross-sectional correlation. In this respect, Driscoll and Kraay (1998) pro-
pose a nonparametric covariance matrix estimator which produces heteroscedasticity consistent
standard errors that are robust to very general forms of contemporaneous and temporal de-
pendence.8 Driscoll and Kraay (1998) point out that the panel data inference problem with
general serial patterns and spatial correlation can be thought of as a time-series problem in the
cross-sectional averages of the products of the regressors and error terms, hit(θˆ) = xiteˆit, then
the relevant cross-sectional average for period t is ht(θˆ) = (1/N)
∑N
i=1 hit(θˆ), where θˆ is a K×1
vector of estimated parameters. The time series behavior of these averages are accounted for
when constructing the covariance matrix, and Driscoll and Kraay (1998) provide the specific
conditions where standard Newey-West technique can be applied.
Essentially, the Driscoll and Kraay’s (1998) covariance matrix estimator equals the het-
eroskedasticity and autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix estimator of Newey and West
(1987) applied to the time series of cross-sectional averages of the hit(θˆ). By relying on cross-
sectional averages, standard errors estimated by this approach are consistent independently
of the panel’s cross-sectional dimension N . Driscoll and Kraay (1998) use mixing random
fields which encompass a broad class of contemporaneous and temporal dependence that are
typically present in panel data. Monte Carlo simulations in Driscoll and Kraay (1998) and
7The standard approach of cross-sectionally de-meaning the data does not solve the problem in heterogenous
panels since common shocks may impact differently on each cross-section.
8Other estimators in the literature that attempt to correct for heteroscedasticity as well as for temporal and
spatial dependence are Parks (1967) and Beck and Katz (1995). However, these estimators can only handle first-
order autoregressive type of dependence, and therefore are not robust to very general forms of cross-section as
well as temporal dependence. Moreover, these procedures rely on parametric models to estimate the covariance
matrix, which may be too restrictive in some cases.
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Hoechle (2007) show that failure to correct for cross-section dependence yields large biases to
least squares standard errors. Furthermore, Hoechle (2007) shows that the coverage rates of
Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are almost invariant to changes in the level of cross-sectional and
temporal correlation. In order to test whether or not errors are cross-sectionally dependent, we
use Pesaran’s (2004) CD statistic (further details are given in the Appendix).
4 Empirical results
4.1 Data
The primary source of our data is Statistics Canada (CANSIM database), which records national
accounts data by provinces. The data span is from 1961 to 2006 and are expressed in Canadian
dollars. Per capita figures are obtained by normalizing by the population for each province.
Our major variables are: gross provincial product (GPPi), provincial income (PIi), provincial
disposable income (PDIi) and consumption (Ci + Gi). All series are expressed in real per capita
terms.
These above variables are collected for all 10 provinces: Newfoundland and Labrador (NL),
Prince Edward Island (PE), Nova Scotia (NS), New Brunswick (NB), Quebec (QC), Ontario
(ON), Manitoba (MB), Saskatchewan (SK), Alberta (AB) and British Columbia (BC). Detailed
definition of the variables and their sources are provided in the Appendix.
4.2 Main results
Our empirical analysis begins by conducting the unit root test for all series. As the Driscoll and
Kraay (1998) procedure is intended for stationary panels, it is important that the series do not
exhibit unit root behavior. To this end, we use the panel unit root test by Pesaran (2007) that
allows for cross-section dependence. Results indicate that for all series, the null hypothesis of
a unit root is strongly rejected, validating our approach. In the interests of brevity, unit root
test results are not reported but are available on request.
Table 1 displays the main empirical results. From Panel A in Table 1, it is apparent that
the extent of risk-sharing among Canadian provinces is modest, as nearly 30 percent of shocks
to gross provincial product are not insured. The statistical significance of the unsmoothed
coefficient (βu) suggests that the null hypothesis of full interprovincial risk-sharing is strongly
rejected. Our breakdown shows that both capital market and the federal tax-transfer system
play an almost equally important role (about 26 percent each) in smoothing shocks to gross
provincial product, which is an indication of the prominent role that the federal government has
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played in Canada, in comparison to, say, the United States. The amount of smoothing at the
last level, which we refer to as credit market smoothing, is 18 percent and is clearly statistically
significant like other components. The total amount of smoothing through capital and credit
markets is therefore 44 percent which clearly dominates the 26 percent smoothed by the federal
government. Unreported results show that the Pesaran’s (2004) CD statistic strongly rejects
the null hypothesis of no cross-section dependence at the 1% level, suggesting that cross-section
dependence should be considered in the analysis. Our finding is different from earlier studies in
many respects. For example, Antia et al. (1999) find a relatively smaller estimate of βu, and
observe a higher estimate for βk and βc. Overall, the differences between our results and those
in previous studies are partly attributable to data as well as methodological improvements.
We also conducted an analysis after dropping Alberta from the sample. Alberta is supported
by a burgeoning petroleum industry with one of the highest per capita gross domestic product
(GDP) in the world. In 2007, Alberta’s per capita GDP was 61 percent higher than the Canadian
average of C$46,441 and more than twice that of some of the Atlantic provinces.9 Panel B in
Table 1 shows a reduction in capital market smoothing (18 percent), which appears to be
compensated by a rise in credit market smoothing (29 percent). We will come back to this
issue in the next section. Not surprisingly, smoothing via federal transfers drops to about 22
percent, as Alberta is a net contributor to the equalization payments. The unsmoothed part
slightly increases to 31 percent. Once again, (unreported) CD test statistic strongly rejects the
null hypothesis of cross-section independence.10
4.3 Subperiods
To get a feel for the changes in the levels of smoothing through markets and fiscal federalism
over time, we redo the above analysis over four subperiods, as reported in Table 2. An im-
portant finding is that over the years there has been a considerable increase in capital market
smoothing, whereas the amount of credit market smoothing declined remarkably. As can be
seen, during the past three decades over one-third of a shock to gross provincial product was
smoothed by capital markets. Over the postwar period Canadian banking system has under-
gone major regulatory and market-driven changes.11 For example, the 1967 amendments to the
Bank Act eliminated the 6 percent ceiling on interest rate on bank loans; the 1987 legislative
changes effectively eliminated the Canadian equivalent of the U.S. Glass-Steagall Act, which
9Wikipedia: Economy of Alberta.
10These unreported results are available from the corresponding author on request.
11The “sunset” clause in Canadian banking legislation requires a periodic reassessments and updating of the
laws governing Canadian bank. As a result, the financial system in Canada has undergone a series of Bank Act
amendments in 1954, 1967, 1980, 1987, 1992, and 1997.
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had previously prohibited banks from participating in the securities business. Naturally, these
changes in the financial landscape have not only widened Canadian commercial banks’ access
to asset markets,12 they have also made it easier for Canadian households to smooth out con-
sumption in the desired way. As banks play a central role in the allocation of capital in the
economy, greater financial integration across jurisdictions, as a result of banking deregulation,
would allow households to trade claims on output (e.g., equity or direct investment) across
provincial borders, thereby sharing province-specific risks with residents of other provinces. We
feel that a deeper examination of the effects of banking deregulations is an interesting topic
for further research, but nevertheless we dare speculate that the persistent increase in capital
market smoothing is a consequence of better financial regulation and policy implemented in the
Canadian banking industry.
By contrast, the large amount of smoothing via credit market during 1962-1970 is clearly
a reflection of the very high concentration with a few large banks holding most of the assets
within the sector (Dean and Schwindt, 1976). However, beginning 1970s, this picture had
started to change. While Canadian banks have traditionally been important players in the
domestic markets, their involvements in the foreign markets were equally important. For ex-
ample, Canadian banks’ foreign currency assets as a percentage of total assets rose from about
15 percent in the late 1950s to a high of 46 percent in the mid-1980s before falling back to
around 38 percent in late 1990s (Freedman, 1998). Much of growth in 1970s and 1980s reflected
Canadian banks’ increasing involvement in the burgeoning Euro-markets as well as lending to
less-developed countries. As a result, direct lending to domestic business and consumers suf-
fered, whilst banks’ participation in the rapidly growing securities market increased heavily.
For example, in 1996, investment banking and other securities fees contributed over one-quarter
of “other income” for the six largest Canadian banks (Freedman, 1998). We believe that this
changing role of the Canadian banks, which went from traditional operations of deposits and
lending to security activities, has been the major contributing factor behind the rise in capital
market and the fall in credit market smoothing in Canada over the past forty years.
In case where market mechanisms (e.g., credit smoothing) fail to stabilize regional output
and employment, intergovernmental transfer mechanisms can contribute to smoothing cyclical
movements resulting from region-specific shocks to output. Indeed, the decrease in credit market
smoothing appears to be partially compensated for by an increase in federal smoothing during
1970s and 1980s. During these years, federal government spending on social services13 increased
12For example, prior to 1987 banks won about 15 percent of treasury bill auctions and 19 percent of Government
of Canada bond auction. In 1996, the comparable number for banks climbed to 62 percent and 50 percent,
respectively (Freedman, 1998).
13Some important categories include spending on equalization payments, CST, CHT, (un)employment benefits,
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dramatically, causing chronic, large-size budget deficits. In fact, despite the rising tax rates,
budget revenues failed to match government expenditure resulting an immense escalation of
public debt and the corresponding interest charge on public debt. After reaching peak in 1996-
97, the debt-to-GDP ratio started to decline following tightening of budgetary spending and
a change in the general approach to public management policy, implemented by the Liberal
government, headed by Jean Chre´tien. The fall in federal smoothing in the 1990s is clearly a
reflection of the wider program of spending restraint of the Chre´tien era.14
Finally, Figure 1 plots a kernel estimate of the different levels of smoothing.15 The stacked
area chart displays the corresponding type of smoothing for the entire sample. The area under
the uppermost curve is the amount left unsmoothed after capital market smoothing, the area
under the curve below is the amount left unsmoothed after capital market plus federal smooth-
ing, and the area under the bottom curve is the amount eventually left unsmoothed. As can be
seen, the trends described above are clearly visible.
4.4 Aggregate data
In this section, we provide evidence of risk-sharing using aggregate Canadian data, which is
defined as the sum of all ten provinces. As is well-known, aggregate data tends to provide
less favorable support of income and consumption smoothing across countries (see e.g., Imbs,
2005). In so doing, we run time series regression corresponding to the regressions in (2)–(5) using
aggregate Canadian data. For the first level of smoothing (equation 2), we obtain the coefficient
19.08 (5.98), where the Newey-West HAC standard errors are in brackets, reflecting significant
evidence of capital market smoothing. For the second level of smoothing (equation 3), we obtain
the coefficient 25.21 (8.87), reflecting strong evidence of federal government smoothing. For the
third level of smoothing (equation 4), we obtain the coefficient 8.05 (8.47), reflecting no credit
market smoothing. Finally, for regression (5) we obtain the coefficient 47.64 (5.64), implying
that a large fraction of shocks is not smoothed. These results can be interpreted as the amount
of income and consumption smoothing of Canada with the rest of the world. Nevertheless,
these results should be interpreted with cautions as one would have to control for fluctuations
in world output. We chose to leave this issue for future research.
old age security, and child tax benefits.
14Another possibility is the pro-cyclical budgetary characteristics of the federal government which prevent
functioning of automatic stabilizers during economic downturns. See CGA-Canada (2008) for further discussion.
15Each curve is constructed using the methodology described in Asdrubali et al. (1996, p. 1095).
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5 Pairwise risk-sharing
The preceding analysis has focused on the extent of overall risk-sharing, which says nothing
about which partner a particular province shares risk with. This section evaluates the channels of
risk-sharing in a bilateral context. This corresponds to N(N−1)/2 or 45 pairwise combinations
comprising the 10 provinces. There are several reasons why the bilateral risk-sharing is an
attractive alternative to the overall risk-sharing presented above. First, the pairwise approach
is not sensitive to a particular benchmark time series. As seen above, the distribution of the
amount of insured shocks changes remarkably when Alberta is excluded from the analysis.
This limitation is easily avoided by considering the pairwise approach. Second, in addition to
quantifying the amount of risk-sharing between any two pairs, i and j, i 6= j = 1, 2, ..., N ; the
pairwise approach can be exploited further to quantify the amount of risk-sharing between any
region i and the rest of the country (i.e., N − 1). This will help us to determine, by province,
the portion of shocks that are smoothed locally, as risk diversification may well happen in
partnership with the rest of the world. Third, as emphasized in the introduction, bilateral
risk-sharing between two specialized provinces such as Quebec and Ontario may be absent
due to their highly correlated incomes, risk-sharing in these two provinces might happen with
potentially different third parties. Our interest in quantifying bilateral risk-sharing is further
motivated by the recent findings that Canadian regional output fluctuations are driven by an
asymmetric and economically important set of disaggregate propagation and growth mechanisms
(Wakerly et al., 2006). In other words, Canadian regions seem not to respond symmetrically
to the same aggregate shock,16 thereby weakening the notion that the regions of Canada form
an optimal currency area (OCA) in the sense of Mundell (1961) – see Wakerly et al. (2006) for
further details.
Equations (2)–(5) are extended to make them applicable to a bilateral context. In particular,
we estimate,
∆ logGPPijt −∆ log PIijt = α+ βk∆ logGPPijt + eijt, (6)
∆ log PIijt −∆ log PDIijt = α+ βf∆ logGPPijt + eijt, (7)
∆ log PDIijt −∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) = α+ βc∆ logGPPijt + eijt, (8)
∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) = α+ βu∆ logGPPijt + eijt, (9)
where, for example, ∆ logGPPijt denotes differences in GPPt between provinces i and j; the
16Scott (2001) provides similar evidence. He reports that the transitory component of Canadian regional
outputs respond asymmetrically to money demand shocks.
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description of the parameters and variables are explained above. Notice the possibility that
Quebec and Ontario choose to insure income with third parties rather than with each other is
accounted for through the presence of the “output gap” term, ∆ logGPPijt. Equations (6)–(9)
spell out the necessary condition for perfect, bilateral risk-sharing between provinces i and j.
Thus, when β = 1 the pair of provinces fully share risk with each other, whereas when β = 0
the pairs do not share risk with each other but with the rest of Canada. It is worth mentioning
that measurement errors are not a relevant issue in the estimation of equations (6)–(9), since
the variables are part of province-level “national accounts”.
Table 3 reports the pairwise risk-sharing through capital markets. An interesting result
that emerges is the prominent role played by Alberta in regional risk-sharing via capital market
mechanisms. Save for Saskatchewan, the remaining eight provinces are seen to smooth shocks
significantly with Alberta. This is perhaps an indication of low correlation of output between
Alberta and other provinces, whereby Alberta’s oil-based economy provides greater opportunity
for risk-sharing for the regional non-oil economies.17 This result is consistent with our main
results (Table 1), which show that excluding Alberta from the analysis significantly weakens the
capital market channel. Among the four easterly provinces, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick
do much better compared with Newfoundland and Labrador and Prince Edward Island in
offsetting asymmetric shocks to output with their western counterparts. Nevertheless, the
largest amount of shocks, among all possible provincial pairs, absorbed through capital market
between Nova Scotia and New Brunswick is eye-catching. This is perhaps due to their dissimilar
economic structures, in which the service sector dominates Nova Scotia’s economy, while New
Brunswick is the third most manufacturing-intensive economy of Canada, after Quebec and
Ontario. Several provincial pairs (e.g., Quebec-Manitoba) exhibit a dis-smoothing through
capital market, although they are not statistically significant.
Table 4 presents the estimates of pairwise risk-sharing through federal tax-transfers sys-
tem. By eyeballing the estimates, we can readily see that there is much evidence of bilateral
risk-sharing among Canadian provinces. Save for New Brunswick, nearly all provincial pairs
exhibit significant evidence of risk-sharing through federal tax-transfer system. This is to be
expected as the system of federal government transfers are designed to offset uneven fiscal ca-
pacities across provinces. Among the various transfer mechanisms, the system of equalization
payment appears to be very relevant, as it provides both redistributive and stabilization roles
17Like Alberta, resource sectors (mainly oil and gas) dominate Newfoundland and Labrador’s economy. How-
ever, unlike Alberta, the contribution of oil and gas to Newfoundland and Labrador’s economic growth is a recent
phenomenon, which may explain why the relationship (i.e., equation (6)) between the two provinces was not
affected.
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of fiscal transfers. Under this system, federal funds are distributed from the “have”18 to the
“have not”19 provinces to address differences in revenue-raising capacity across provinces (the
‘redistributive’ role), while simultaneously insuring recipient governments against cyclical, ad-
verse fiscal conditions affecting them on a short-term basis (the ‘stabilization’ role). Quoting
Smart (2004): ‘equalization is sometimes called the “glue” that holds the Canadian federation
together.’ On the other hand, the case of bilateral risk-sharing through federal transfers among
the three rich provincial pairs (i.e., ON-AB, ON-BC, and AB-BC) can be interpreted in relation
to other transfer mechanisms such as the CST and CHT programs, which are calculated on an
equal per capita cash basis to ensure government’s commitment to provide equal support for
all Canadians. For all other provincial pairs, all means of federal transfer programs would be
contributors to the pairwise risk-sharing observed.
The estimates of pairwise risk-sharing through credit market are presented in Table 5. First,
we observe that eight provinces (except Saskatchewan) do not share risk with Alberta by means
of credit markets. Recall that these were the same provinces that exhibited very strong evidence
of risk-sharing with Alberta through capital markets. Taken this way, Alberta offers a trade-off
between capital and credit markets smoothing to the rest of Canada. Put differently, Alberta is
reluctant to grant credit to other provinces during economic downturn, while it is a safe-haven for
these provinces to smooth their incomes through capital markets. By contrast, Saskatchewan’s
strong evidence of credit risk-sharing with Alberta can be interpreted in light of high out-
migration from the former to the latter. For example, from 1971/72 to 2006/07, each year
on average nearly 1.20 percent of Saskatchewan population migrated to Alberta, the highest
among Canadian provinces.20 It is quite natural for workers in Saskatchewan to leave their
families to look after the farm, while the male heads migrate to Alberta for better employment
opportunities. Likewise, Alberta has benefitted from out-migration from neighboring provinces.
Therefore, it is possible that individuals from Saskatchewan might have built credit records in
Alberta that make it easier for them to access credit in bad times.
Table 6 displays the estimates of pairwise coefficients representing the unsmoothed risk com-
ponent. The most striking aspect of interprovincial risk-sharing is the large and significant point
estimate of the pairwise coefficient between Quebec and Ontario, indicating that a significant
fraction of shocks between the two neighboring provinces has not been smoothed. On the sur-
face this may seem surprising given the remarkable interdependence of trade between Quebec
and Ontario. For example, in 1996 about 58 percent of Quebec’s interprovincial exports went
18Ontario, Alberta, and British Columbia.
19Newfoundland, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, Quebec, Manitoba, and Saskatchewan.
20Source: authors’ calculations based on CANSIM Tables 051-0001 and 051-0019.
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to Ontario, whereas about 40 percent of Ontario’s exports were sent to Quebec markets (Page,
2002). To speculate on the possible reasons behind the large unsmoothed part, in Figure 2
we have plotted real GDP per capita and its growth rates for Quebec and Ontario over the
period 1962-2006. As can be seen, outputs of both provinces appear to move together, where
Quebec’s output has historically been lower than that of Ontario. Moreover, the growth rates
of their outputs appear equally volatile and seem to move together. In fact, based on 1965-
2002 regional outputs data, Wakerly et al. (2006) observe strong comovement in trends and
cycles in Quebec and Ontario outputs. Taken together, these results suggest that the extent
of risk-sharing between Quebec and Ontario is low because of high degree of co-fluctuations of
output between them, risk-sharing happens via other provinces.21 On the other hand, a good
number of provinces display significant evidence of unsmoothed shocks with British Columbia.
Perhaps distance is a factor behind this result, as British Columbia is the most westerly province
in Canada. Estimates of the unsmoothed component for several economically poor provincial
pairs (e.g., PE-QC, NS-MB) are low, although these estimates are all statistically insignificant,
one can get a feel that further scope of risk-sharing among these provinces are limited.
To take advantage of the pairwise approach characterizing the dynamics of interprovincial
risk-sharing, we have proceeded to compute the fraction of shocks smoothed by a particular
province with the rest of Canada–which is defined as the sum of outputs of the ten provinces
less the province in question.22 The results are presented in Table 7. Several comments are in
order. First, the amount of shocks smoothed through capital market is higher among economi-
cally poorer provinces (e.g., Nova Scotia) than richer provinces (e.g., Ontario). It is possible that
richer provinces are more financially integrated with international than national financial mar-
kets. For example, a significant portion of Alberta’s “Heritage Savings and Trust Fund”, which
aims to generate greatest financial returns on those savings for Albertans, comprises bond and
equites of international markets. Second, the extent of federal government smoothing between
each Canadian province and the rest of Canada is surprisingly similar. This is an indication of
a well-designed federal transfer system. Third, the credit channel is not working for any of the
provinces. Since credit market smoothing is a result of ex post arrangements, insurance after
the occurrence of shocks is nonexistent. This poses a puzzle concerning the Canadian economic
union which is generally assumed to be much tighter than its US and European counterparts.
Finally, it is very interesting to observe that Quebec smoothes the largest fraction of shocks to
gross provincial production with the rest of Canada. This has important implications relating
21There is an old literature examining business cycle patterns between Quebec and Ontario. See Raynauld
(1988) and the references therein for discussion on this subject.
22In regressions (6)–(9), this is obtained by defining subscript j as the rest of Canada.
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to the assessment of the economic effects of Quebec separation. If national boundaries are
such an important determinant of income and consumption smoothing in Quebec, the ability to
maintain the existing risk-sharing with the rest of Canada after separation becomes both more
important and more uncertain.23
Summing up, the pairwise approach sheds many important micro details that are often left
out when focusing on the overall (risk-sharing) approach. It offers a richer insight as to the
ability or lack thereof of individual provinces to weather the storm by leaning on inherent market
mechanisms and/or fiscal federalism. It also tenders decision makers a better springboard
for income redistribution, be it for time of economic downturns or for the usual equalization
payment scheme.
6 Conclusions
We examine the extent of risk-sharing among Canadian provinces using both market and non-
market channels employing data over the period 1961-2006. Several interesting findings emerge
from the analysis. First, both capital market and the federal tax-transfer system play an almost
equally important role (about 26 percent each) in smoothing shocks to gross provincial product.
This result highlights the influential role played by the federal government in buffering asymmet-
ric regional shocks. Second, while overall 18 percent of shocks are smoothed by credit market,
this channel does not lend evidence of significant risk-sharing bilaterally. A decade-by-decade
analysis reveals that smoothing via capital market has persistently increased, while the credit
channel became less and less important. We speculate this trend as a consequence of several
postwar regulatory changes in the Canadian banking industry. Finally, the pairwise analysis
brings up several important details about the extent and nature of interprovincial risk-sharing,
which has not been analyzed with regional data. The pairwise approach offers a new dimension
to understanding regional risk-sharing that can help decision makers in formulating policies to
remedy the weak links of incomplete risk-sharing.
23Helliwell (1996) observes a similar outcome using merchandise trade flows among Canadian provinces and
between Canadian provinces and U.S. states. He finds that Quebec trades twenty times more with other Canadian
provinces than it does with other U.S. states of similar size and distance.
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A Data appendix
The sample period begins in 1961 and extends to 2006. The data were extracted from Statistics
Canada’s CANSIM database. Detailed definition and exact source for each series is provided
below.24 Save for CPI and population data, all figures are in millions of Canadian dollars. The
data are available from the corresponding author on request.
Gross provincial product
Gross domestic product is taken from CANSIM Table 384-0035 for the years 1961-1980 and from
Table 384-0035 for years 1981-2006. Provincial GDP is then divided by its own CPI followed
by population to arrive at real GDP per person. Canadian real GDP per capita is defined as
the sum of the ten provinces’ GDP, divided by Canadian CPI and then divided by the sum of
ten provinces’ populations.
Provincial income
It is calculated as follows:
Personal income
– Federal transfers to persons
– Federal transfers to provincial and local governments
= Provincial income
The source of personal income is similar to that reported for GDP. Federal transfer to per-
sons is taken from CANSIM Table 384-0022 for the years 1961-1980 and from Table 384-0004 for
years 1981-2006. Federal transfer to provincial and local governments is taken from CANSIM
Table 384-003 for the years 1961-1980 and from Table 384-0011 for years 1981-2006. Provincial
income is divided by its own CPI and then by population to arrive at real provincial income
per person. Canadian income is calculated in a similar way as Canadian GDP.
Provincial disposable income
It is calculated as follows:
Personal income
– Direct taxes from persons to federal government
– Direct taxes from corporations to federal government
– Indirect taxes
+ Other current transfer from persons
= Provincial disposable income
Source of personal income is mentioned above. The other remaining items were taken from
the similar CANSIM Tables as federal transfers to persons (mentioned above). Provincial dis-
posable income is divided by its own CPI and then by population to arrive at real provincial
disposable income per person. Canadian disposable income is calculated in a similar way as
Canadian GDP.
24We have followed similar data definitions as Antia et al. (1999).
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Consumption
Personal expenditure on consumer goods and services
+ Government current expenditure on goods and services
= Total consumption
Both consumption items are taken from CANSIM Table 384-0015 for the years 1961-1980
and from Table 384-0002 for the years 1981-2006. Total consumption is divided by its own CPI
and then by population to arrive at real provincial income per person. Canadian consumption
is calculated in a similar way as Canadian GDP.
Consumer price index (CPI)
Provincial CPI for the years 1961-1978 is taken from Di Matteo (2003) and from CANSIM Table
326-0021 for the years 1979-2006. The base years is 2002. Canadian CPI is calculated by taking
average of ten provincial CPI.
Provincial population
Provincial population for the years 1961-1970 is taken from CANSIM Table 384-0035 and from
Table 510-001 for the years 1971-2006. Canadian population is defined as the sum of ten
provinces’ population.
B Testing for cross-section dependence
Pesaran (2004) presents a simple test of error cross-section dependence (CD) that is valid
asymptotically under very general conditions and can be applied to both stationary and non-
stationary panels. The test statistic is based on the average of the pairwise Pearson’s correlation
coefficients pˆj , j = 1, 2, . . . , n, where n = N (N − 1) /2, of the residuals obtained from the
estimation of autoregressive (AR) regression models. The CD statistic in Pesaran (2004) is
given by,
CD =
√
2T
n
n∑
j=1
pˆj → N (0, 1) .
This statistic tests the null hypothesis of cross-section independence against the alternative
hypothesis of dependence. Simulation results in Pesaran (2004) show that the statistic has
reasonably good finite sample performance in terms of size and power.
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Figure 1: Year-by-year income and consumption smoothing
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Figure 2: Real GDP per capita and growth rates: Quebec (QC) and Ontario (ON)
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Table 1: Channels of interprovincial risk-sharing (percent): Full-sample (1962-2006)
A. With Alberta B. Without Alberta
Estimates Estimates
Capital market (βk) 26.30∗∗∗ 18.23∗
(7.15) (8.99)
Transfers (βf ) 25.91∗∗∗ 21.74∗∗∗
(6.63) (5.01)
Credit market (βc) 18.07∗ 28.87∗∗
(9.78) (10.45)
Not smoothed (βu) 29.70∗∗∗ 31.14∗∗∗
(4.07) (4.38)
Note: Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in ( ). The lag length is chosen
using Newey and West’s (1994) plug-in procedure, 4(T/100)2/9. βk is the
slope in the regression of ∆ logGPPi−∆ log PIi on ∆ logGPPi; βf is the slope
in the regression of ∆ log PIi−∆ log PDIi on ∆ logGPPi; βc is the slope in the
regression of ∆ log PDIi −∆ log(Ci + Gi) on ∆ logGPPi; and βu is the slope
in the regression of ∆ log(Ci + Gi) on ∆ logGPPi. The β-coefficients are
interpreted as the incremental percentage amounts of smoothing achieved
at each level, and βu is the amount of unsmoothed shocks. ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗
denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 2: Channels of interprovincial risk-sharing (percent): Subperiods
1962- 1971- 1981- 1991-
1970 1980 1990 2000
Capital market (βk) -11.01 33.60∗∗∗ 40.60∗∗∗ 42.87∗∗∗
(13.50) (10.03) (7.41) (7.94)
Transfers (βf ) 11.98∗∗∗ 37.29∗∗ 36.45∗∗∗ 13.30∗∗
(1.75) (15.64) (4.71) (4.90)
Credit market (βc) 88.29∗∗∗ 4.34 -0.32 5.47
(16.29) (14.16) (7.62) (5.29)
Not smoothed (βu) 10.74∗ 24.75∗∗∗ 23.25∗∗∗ 38.34∗∗∗
(5.65) (5.18) (4.28) (6.76)
Note: See Table 1. Driscoll-Kraay standard errors are in ( ). ∗, ∗∗,
and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table 3: Pairwise risk-sharing via capital market channel (percent)
βk Robust S.E. βk Robust S.E.
NL-PE 10.81 (22.76) NS-BC 48.09∗∗∗ (6.12)
NL-NS 21.40 (29.00) NB-QC 56.37∗∗∗ (12.89)
NL-NB 50.77 (31.48) NB-ON 74.68∗∗∗ (12.34)
NL-QC 25.49 (29.26) NB-MB 57.86∗∗ (22.79)
NL-ON 27.87 (30.91) NB-SK 29.06 (22.69)
NL-MB 14.24 (24.41) NB-AB 70.27∗∗∗ (6.34)
NL-SK 3.10 (18.24) NB-BC 56.14∗∗∗ (9.48)
NL-AB 46.57∗∗ (20.55) QC-ON 1.66 (20.07)
NL-BC 34.81 (22.96) QC-MB –9.01 (12.83)
PE-NS 9.91 (13.92) QC-SK –0.33 (12.31)
PE-NB 55.12∗ (29.12) QC-AB 71.27∗∗∗ (7.68)
PE-QC –8.46 (9.07) QC-BC 46.46∗∗∗ (8.06)
PE-ON –0.64 (11.38) ON-MB –0.78 (10.21)
PE-MB –11.22 (11.50) ON-SK 1.92 (12.33)
PE-SK 1.74 (16.00) ON-AB 68.60∗∗∗ (7.06)
PE-AB 48.56∗∗∗ (8.36) ON-BC 29.99∗∗∗ (9.11)
PE-BC 9.57 (11.23) MB-SK 1.77 (10.47)
NS-NB 82.75∗∗∗ (19.62) MB-AB 65.15∗∗∗ (10.40)
NS-QC 25.57∗ (15.17) MB-BC 7.09 (10.03)
NS-ON 63.27∗∗∗ (12.23) SK-AB –0.57 (13.39)
NS-MB 61.41∗∗∗ (13.76) SK-BC –2.81 (11.79)
NS-SK 21.83 (15.85) AB-BC 78.39∗∗∗ (5.43)
NS-AB 68.68∗∗∗ (9.42)
Note: Time period is 1962–2006. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. βk is the slope
coefficient of the regression ∆ logGPPijt −∆ log PIijt on ∆ logGPPijt, equation (6)
in the text. The variable ∆ logGPPijt (∆ log PIijt) denotes differences in GPPt (PIt)
between provinces i and j. Province code: NL (Newfoundland and Labrador); PE
(Prince Edward Island); NS (Nova Scotia); NB (New Brunswick); QC (Quebec);
ON (Ontario); MB (Manitoba); SK (Saskatchewan); AB (Alberta); BC (British
Columbia). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
level, respectively.
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Table 4: Pairwise risk-sharing via federal transfers channel (percent)
βf Robust S.E. βf Robust S.E.
NL-PE 30.49∗∗ (14.75) NS-BC 13.98∗∗∗ (3.88)
NL-NS 32.38∗ (16.93) NB-QC 7.69∗ (4.20)
NL-NB 15.45 (16.44) NB-ON 2.58 (5.05)
NL-QC 29.97 (18.35) NB-MB 0.76 (6.92)
NL-ON 38.18∗ (19.01) NB-SK 10.05 (6.79)
NL-MB 30.54∗∗ (14.41) NB-AB 30.74 (18.60)
NL-SK 19.39∗∗ (9.04) NB-BC 7.41 (5.30)
NL-AB 50.28∗∗∗ (18.49) QC-ON 15.62∗∗∗ (5.73)
NL-BC 31.99∗∗ (14.55) QC-MB 22.32∗∗∗ (5.72)
PE-NS 27.92∗∗∗ (7.98) QC-SK 18.54∗∗ (7.69)
PE-NB 8.59 (14.08) QC-AB 52.88∗∗∗ (17.91)
PE-QC 47.66∗∗∗ (4.85) QC-BC 14.87∗∗∗ (4.67)
PE-ON 46.12∗∗∗ (5.37) ON-MB 24.81∗∗∗ (6.49)
PE-MB 35.67∗∗∗ (4.93) ON-SK 19.32∗∗∗ (6.72)
PE-SK 25.42∗∗∗ (6.93) ON-AB 48.26∗∗∗ (16.67)
PE-AB 47.26∗∗∗ (13.90) ON-BC 20.42∗∗∗ (5.15)
PE-BC 35.41∗∗∗ (6.72) MB-SK 15.77∗∗ (6.45)
NS-NB 6.35 (7.24) MB-AB 48.53∗∗ (19.97)
NS-QC 16.04∗∗ (7.84) MB-BC 19.93∗∗ (7.59)
NS-ON 9.69 (7.10) SK-AB 12.68∗ (7.28)
NS-MB –4.23 (3.70) SK-BC 14.66∗ (8.36)
NS-SK 14.59∗∗ (5.50) AB-BC 61.44∗∗∗ (19.91)
NS-AB 38.46∗∗ (16.55)
Note: Time period is 1962–2006. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. βf is the slope coefficient
of the regression ∆ log PIijt−∆ log PDIijt on ∆ logGPPijt, equation (7) in the text.
∆ logGPPijt, ∆ log PIijt, and ∆ log PDIijt denote differences in GPPt, PIt, and PDIt,
respectively, between provinces i and j. Province code: NL (Newfoundland and
Labrador); PE (Prince Edward Island); NS (Nova Scotia); NB (New Brunswick);
QC (Quebec); ON (Ontario); MB (Manitoba); SK (Saskatchewan); AB (Alberta);
BC (British Columbia). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 5: Pairwise risk-sharing via credit market channel (percent)
βc Robust S.E. βc Robust S.E.
NL-PE 40.47∗∗∗ (11.74) NS-BC 12.69∗∗ (5.17)
NL-NS 32.70∗∗∗ (7.15) NB-QC 27.50∗∗∗ (8.57)
NL-NB 20.51∗∗ (9.17) NB-ON 9.83∗∗ (4.83)
NL-QC 23.51∗∗∗ (6.11) NB-MB 30.99∗∗ (12.72)
NL-ON 12.66∗ (6.40) NB-SK 48.05∗∗ (19.94)
NL-MB 40.46∗∗∗ (12.87) NB-AB –12.58 (20.53)
NL-SK 57.29∗∗∗ (20.23) NB-BC 16.74∗∗∗ (4.39)
NL-AB –13.48 (19.00) QC-ON 29.97 (30.83)
NL-BC 10.49 (7.05) QC-MB 62.05∗∗∗ (10.79)
PE-NS 53.29∗∗∗ (13.99) QC-SK 66.62∗∗∗ (21.05)
PE-NB 30.29∗∗∗ (11.31) QC-AB –36.01∗ (20.45)
PE-QC 58.64∗∗∗ (10.66) QC-BC 7.52 (11.01)
PE-ON 42.06∗∗∗ (9.71) ON-MB 43.22∗∗∗ (11.54)
PE-MB 61.88∗∗∗ (11.83) ON-SK 60.06∗∗∗ (19.72)
PE-SK 57.06∗∗ (22.42) ON-AB –32.49∗ (19.12)
PE-AB –7.88 (18.92) ON-BC 9.72∗ (5.38)
PE-BC 34.20∗∗∗ (9.92) MB-SK 71.91∗∗∗ (16.00)
NS-NB 8.42 (11.65) MB-AB –22.10 (24.63)
NS-QC 38.11∗∗∗ (8.71) MB-BC 40.02∗∗∗ (11.76)
NS-ON 12.41∗∗ (4.64) SK-AB 76.25∗∗∗ (19.75)
NS-MB 38.46∗∗∗ (13.06) SK-BC 69.89∗∗∗ (23.20)
NS-SK 51.82∗∗ (19.57) AB-BC –52.44∗∗ (21.11)
NS-AB –16.93 (22.52)
Note: Time period is 1962–2006. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrela-
tion consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. βc is the slope coefficient
of the regression ∆ log PDIijt −∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) on ∆ logGPPijt, equation (8) in
the text. ∆ logGPPijt, ∆ log PDIijt, and ∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) denote differences in
GPPt, PDIt, and (Ct + Gt), respectively, between provinces i and j. Province code:
NL (Newfoundland and Labrador); PE (Prince Edward Island); NS (Nova Sco-
tia); NB (New Brunswick); QC (Quebec); ON (Ontario); MB (Manitoba); SK
(Saskatchewan); AB (Alberta); BC (British Columbia). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Unsmoothed pairwise risk-sharing (percent)
βu Robust S.E. βu Robust S.E.
NL-PE 18.21 (11.37) NS-BC 25.22∗∗∗ (3.15)
NL-NS 13.50 (14.16) NB-QC 8.42 (11.17)
NL-NB 13.24 (12.16) NB-ON 12.90 (10.60)
NL-QC 21.01 (13.05) NB-MB 10.37 (7.94)
NL-ON 21.27∗ (12.16) NB-SK 12.82∗∗ (5.66)
NL-MB 14.74 (10.45) NB-AB 11.57∗∗∗ (3.77)
NL-SK 20.20∗∗∗ (5.65) NB-BC 19.69∗∗ (8.09)
NL-AB 16.62∗∗ (6.35) QC-ON 52.72∗∗∗ (19.41)
NL-BC 22.69∗∗ (9.04) QC-MB 24.62∗∗∗ (5.72)
PE-NS 8.86 (5.66) QC-SK 15.17∗∗ (6.41)
PE-NB 5.98 (9.26) QC-AB 11.86∗∗∗ (3.13)
PE-QC 2.14 (6.27) QC-BC 31.13∗∗∗ (11.62)
PE-ON 12.45∗∗ (5.92) ON-MB 32.75∗∗∗ (6.36)
PE-MB 13.66∗∗∗ (4.25) ON-SK 18.68∗∗∗ (5.63)
PE-SK 15.76∗∗ (7.69) ON-AB 15.62∗∗∗ (3.35)
PE-AB 12.05∗∗∗ (2.56) ON-BC 39.86∗∗∗ (6.58)
PE-BC 20.80∗∗∗ (6.23) MB-SK 10.52∗∗∗ (3.89)
NS-NB 2.46 (9.27) MB-AB 8.42∗∗ (3.51)
NS-QC 20.26∗∗∗ (4.80) MB-BC 32.94∗∗∗ (8.16)
NS-ON 14.60∗∗ (6.23) SK-AB 11.62∗∗∗ (4.07)
NS-MB 4.36 (7.88) SK-BC 18.25∗∗∗ (6.06)
NS-SK 11.75∗∗∗ (3.25) AB-BC 12.59∗∗∗ (3.20)
NS-AB 9.78∗∗∗ (2.94)
Note: Time period is 1962–2006. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocor-
relation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses. βu is the slope
coefficient of the regression ∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) on ∆ logGPPijt, equation (9) in the
text. ∆ logGPPijt and ∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) denote differences in GPPt and (Ct + Gt),
respectively, between provinces i and j. Province code: NL (Newfoundland and
Labrador); PE (Prince Edward Island); NS (Nova Scotia); NB (New Brunswick);
QC (Quebec); ON (Ontario); MB (Manitoba); SK (Saskatchewan); AB (Alberta);
BC (British Columbia). ∗, ∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7: Extent of income and consumption smoothing (percent)
Provinces βk βf βc βu
NL 16.72∗∗∗ 24.48∗∗∗ 13.29 45.49∗∗∗
(6.10) (8.01) (10.90) (5.22)
PE 25.64∗∗∗ 26.15∗∗∗ 1.13 47.05∗∗∗
(6.48) (8.26) (8.99) (4.28)
NS 25.26∗∗∗ 26.02∗∗∗ 8.69 40.01∗∗∗
(5.93) (7.37) (8.95) (5.22)
NB 16.80∗∗ 24.50∗∗∗ 7.63 51.05∗∗∗
(7.09) (8.91) (9.82) (5.97)
QC 20.44∗∗∗ 27.80∗∗∗ 11.78 39.95∗∗∗
(6.16) (8.86) (8.79) (6.53)
ON 18.31∗∗∗ 26.19∗∗∗ 9.36 46.11∗∗∗
(6.52) (9.64) (8.48) (6.60)
MB 19.45∗∗∗ 25.90∗∗∗ 10.06 44.56∗∗∗
(6.34) (9.23) (8.96) (6.74)
SK 22.38∗∗∗ 19.00∗∗ 9.23 49.37∗∗∗
(7.71) (8.13) (6.13) (6.59)
AB 15.85 26.43∗∗∗ 14.72 42.98∗∗∗
(9.58) (9.35) (10.43) (7.12)
BC 17.88∗∗∗ 26.38∗∗∗ 8.66 47.05∗∗∗
(5.79) (9.77) (8.19) (7.11)
Note: Time period is 1962–2006. Newey-West heteroskedasticity and
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors are in parentheses.
The β-coefficients are interpreted as the fraction of shocks smoothed by
a particular province with the rest of Canada, and βu is the amount
of unsmoothed shocks. βk is the slope coefficient of the regression
∆ logGPPijt−∆ log PIijt on ∆ logGPPijt; βf is the slope coefficient of the
regression ∆ log PIijt −∆ log PDIijt on ∆ logGPPijt; βc is the slope coef-
ficient of the regression ∆ log PDIijt −∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) on ∆ logGPPijt;
and βu is the slope coefficient of the regression ∆ log(Cijt + Gijt) on
∆ logGPPijt. ∆ logGPPijt, for example, denotes differences in GPPt be-
tween a particular province i and the rest of Canada j, where j is defined
as N−1, and N is the number of Canadian provinces. Province code: NL
(Newfoundland and Labrador); PE (Prince Edward Island); NS (Nova
Scotia); NB (New Brunswick); QC (Quebec); ON (Ontario); MB (Man-
itoba); SK (Saskatchewan); AB (Alberta); BC (British Columbia). ∗,
∗∗, and ∗∗∗ denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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